After the Bali bombing – the long road to recovery

Yetta Gurtner presents aspects of Bali’s recovery and looks at the strategies and lessons for disaster management and tourism

Abstract

Few would dispute that the terrorist bombings of October 2002 precipitated a crisis for Kuta and Bali. Beyond the direct impacts, the tourism sector was devastated and the community that had become reliant on this revenue experienced significant socio-economic effects. Through a description of emergency response efforts and the local atmosphere both three and 18 months after the event, it is possible to understand some of the emergent issues and recovery strategies developed. While academics and practitioners generally recommend the use of an integrated crisis management plan, the Bali experience demonstrates some of the accomplishments and obstacles in achieving such sustainable and holistic participation. Beyond the tragedy, effective community recovery provides the opportunity to develop greater defence mechanisms and resilience.

Introduction

At approximately 11:20pm, Saturday October 12, 2002, the idyllic island paradise of Bali was rocked by a series of devastating explosions. Paddies Bar and the Sari Club on the main street of Kuta bore the brunt of the impact. Both entertainment venues were packed with unsuspecting tourists, staff and revellers; many others were in the vicinity. Despite medical and emergency response efforts, 202 people died as a result of these blasts and hundreds more were injured—with varying degrees of severity (ABC Online 2003).

Revealed as an act of terrorism, the Bali Bombings affected more than just the direct victims and their families. Amidst altruism and adversity, the community of Bali has struggled to regain some sense of stability and normalisation following this tragedy. While international media attention assured emotional and financial support, negative images and growing concerns regarding safety served to undermine the tourism industry (Kalla 2003). Dependent on the income generated through tourist expenditure, many individuals and businesses in Bali have been faced with the loss of their livelihoods. Beyond the immediate response, rehabilitation of physical infrastructure and short-term provision of aid, effective disaster recovery efforts need to address all impacts on the community—with an aim of sustainability. Implicit in such revitalization is greater local resistance and resilience. The challenge for Kuta and Bali has been for the various organisations and agencies to effectively collaborate, strategise, and achieve, in a situation of limited resources.

Theoretical perspective—integrated crisis management plans and tourism

A review of the general disaster relief literature suggests that the formation of an effective partnership between businesses, the humanitarian organisations, all levels of government and the local community (stakeholders) should ultimately reduce social vulnerabilities (Corporate Social Responsibility Forum 2003). Additional research relating to crisis conditions in tourism-reliant destinations by both academics and industry professionals such as Somnez, Apostopoulos and Tarlow (1999), recommends that such a partnership can establish greater socio-economic resilience through the development of a comprehensive crisis management plan and associated recovery marketing strategies. Based on the experience of this terrorist attack, it is apparent that the community of Bali needs to be better prepared for the event of any crisis—natural or man-made.

Respected organisations such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP 1992) and World Health Organisation (WHO 2002) propose that the
“ideal” design for an integrated crisis management plan incorporate concepts of awareness, planning, response and recovery. Associated issues such as security, regional stability, contingency planning, available resources, emergency procedures, communication, rehabilitation and mitigation, need to be clearly addressed. Successful development and implementation of such a plan requires familiarity, understanding and training at all levels of society. To remain effective each element must also be regularly reviewed and updated. As this type of crisis management is not limited to the emergency responders or government departments, it is recommended that be consigned to a co-operative of relevant stakeholders, to work as an independent organisational entity with the full representation of all involved (Mansfield 1999, ADPC 2001). Continued budgeting expenses should be borne by participants from both the public and private sector.

Given the strong relationship between positive perceptions and socio-economic viability in areas of high tourism dependence it is considered prudent to ensure that all stakeholders are included in this concerned partnership (Bierman 2003). Informed tourism advice and experience would ensure that relevant destination image, marketing, and promotional initiatives, are included at all phases of the crisis management plan. Case studies in the book Tourism, Crime and International Security Issues (Pizam and Mansfield 1996) reveal that effective tourism strategies have included media liaison, public relations, provision of credible and accurate information, and partnering with law enforcement officials. While targeted advertising, active promotion and the hosting of conferences and international events may be used to restore regional, domestic and international confidence proactive research and analysis can identify new opportunities and potential markets.

Beyond increased resilience the purpose of any crisis management plan is to improve a community’s capacity to efficiently respond to a hazard—whether threat or reality. Constructive crisis management should be integrated, holistic and sustainable, rather than simply reactive. It is actually within the process of planning that requisite communication and public/private sector partnerships may be established. Through the open, multilateral sharing of information, experience and knowledge it is possible to anticipate a diversity of problems, formulate appropriate response techniques, and determine organisational responsibilities. In the event of a crisis the existence of an effective and widely understood plan can facilitate rapid assessment, co-ordination and the implementation of an appropriate response effort. Prior consideration and discussion can help reduce suspicion, jurisdictional issues, confusion and duplication. In effectively communicating and managing a crisis, negative impacts can be minimised and community recovery may be achieved sooner (Bierman 2003).
Despite admirable response efforts and altruistic intentions it is apparent that prior to the tragic events of October 12, 2002 Bali had no operational crisis management plan or integrated recovery strategies. While subsequent programs and activities have attempted to address issues of social and economic development, crisis management and promotion, experience has revealed some of the disparities between theoretical ideals and practical realities.

**Initial response—disaster and reactions**

Response efforts immediately following the Bali Bombing were typical of most disaster situations (LaPlante 1988). The main priority was to respond to the emergency and keep losses to a minimum—this included search and rescue efforts, locating and bringing survivors to safety, provision of basic first aid, and crowd control in the immediate vicinity of the incident. Images show how the fires were raging, the electricity supply was severed, and the area was strewn with debris, broken glass, metal and twisted vehicle shells. In addition to those caught in the impact of the blast, the explosion attracted the attention of the curious, concerned and those who simply wanted to help.

The injured who were able to walk or be carried were taken to the closest medical facilities by any means available. As rapid emergency response teams and other volunteers managed to establish access to the site, other victims were transported in ambulances. Witnesses described how the numbers, severity of injuries and rapid influx of victims at the medical centres proved overwhelming (Ellis 2003, Stevenson and Baker 2002). There were insufficient trained personnel, limited supplies and facilities, and inadequate medical equipment. Many patients were treated in hallways while doctors and medical staff tried to maintain sterile conditions. The morgue was unable to accommodate the growing numbers of the deceased. Volunteers from all sectors of society, including tourists, immediately made themselves available to the hospitals to help in tasks such as nursing and comforting the wounded, giving blood, operating the telephone lines and setting up a database of the missing and dead.

Within days the Bali Recovery Group, a co-ordinating committee of existing local Non Government Organisations (NGOs), was created with the aim to “help deliver the best services, collect data and minimise duplication of effort” (Bali Recovery Group 2004, Bali Relief Ubud 2002). Arrangements were made for the most seriously injured to be evacuated overseas, while medical assistance continued and more victims were identified. Through physical and fiscal donations medical supplies and trained surgeons arrived, office equipment was attained to assist administration, and basic needs such as food, clothing and emergency shelter were provided. Grief and trauma counselling was established for victims, their families, and those affected by the bombing. Daily updates and briefings were also conducted in an attempt to keep everyone informed (BaliSOS 2004).

The bombing inflicted physical, emotional and economic damage.
As most of the immediate medical needs were met, official efforts began to focus on the clean up and restoration of vital functions of the community. While the Balinese and national authorities expressed sympathy and condolences, greater security was committed to provide reassurance to both residents and visitors to the island (Beratha 2002, Indo.com (b) 2002). The Indonesian police and military also began work with an international investigation team at the bomb site to try and ascertain the facts and trace potential suspects.

Despite overt government and regional attempts to restore stability, the majority of international tourists opted to leave Bali. Already personally distressed by the incident, locals and businesses in Kuta experienced an immediate decline in trade. Many of the devoutly religious Balinese turned to ritual and ceremony in an attempt to restore physical and spiritual harmony to the island and renew faith (Indo.com (a) 2002, Ballinger 2002). Several ceremonies, inviting participants from all religious denominations and nationalities, were held at the site to purify and cleanse it of all residual chaotic influences. Attracting dignitaries and media attention from around the world, Bali publicly displayed the level of grief and anxiety caused by the bombing.

While the scene was cleared of debris and reconstruction of the surrounding buildings initiated, tourist numbers continued to decrease. Business for most in the region became severely limited. Beyond the physical and emotional damage, the terrorist attack revealed the relative instability of the tourism industry and the vulnerability of those dependant on the revenue it generates.

Early issues and perceptions (3–4 months after the terrorist attacks)

As supplies, training and substantial funding continued to be offered through donors, disaster assistance focused on those identified as the direct victims of the bombing. The Bali Recovery Group and other administrators (2004) oversaw the provision of such support included medical treatment, financial aid, psychological counselling, food and accommodation. There was a high degree of consensus between government, NGOs, private enterprise and the local community that such assistance remained a relief priority. The majority of residents and businesses in Kuta and Bali however, had developed a strong reliance on tourism and associated economic and social impacts soon became the predominant issue.

Experience from other tourist-reliant destinations such as Luxor (Egypt), Israel and Turkey, indicated that the revival of the tourism industry after such acts of terrorism can be unpredictable. The research of Somnez et al (1999), Pizam and Mansfield (1996) identified short-term loss of investment confidence, declines in economic growth, and lower job creation are common symptoms of a destination in crisis. Associated economic, social and psychological impacts included unemployment, bankruptcies,
business closures, migration, increased social tension, pessimism, depression and changes in lifestyle. As such effects became more apparent in Bali, various stakeholders developed strategies aimed at industry and community recovery.

Reports (both official and unofficial), three months after the bombing indicated that many of these early recovery efforts achieved limited success. Examination of Indonesian statistics (BPS Statistics Indonesia 2004) reveal that direct foreign arrivals were down 30–40% on previous years and hotel occupancy rates had dropped below 40%. BaliSOS (2004), a local NGO, estimated that approximately 100,000 had already lost their jobs—most from the informal sector. Many businesses encouraged staff to take unpaid leave, scaled back working hours and reduced salaries in attempt to remain operational. Numerous closed and/or empty shops were testimony to those that failed.

Early findings presented to the Consultative Group of Indonesia (CGI 2003, World Bank 2003, Kalla 2003) claimed that most residents of Kuta were able to meet their basic needs through a variety of coping strategies and community solidarity (World Bank 2003, Kalla 2003). Such strategies included accessing savings, selling assets, and return migration to villages. Unfortunately, with limited resources these were considered short-term solutions. Increased competition for fewer jobs, and a growing blame and resentment towards Muslims, heightened social tensions. Despite the enhanced security, kidnapping, theft, illicit drug use, blackmail and other crimes affecting both residents and tourist were being committed. Local events involving illegal cockfighting and gambling became more abundant. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the island of Bali developed the highest per capita consumption of anti-depressants in Indonesia—with patients as young as 10 years old.

Despite such hardships, the majority of people in the community had tried to move beyond the shock and disbelief towards the resumption of a normal lifestyle. Streets remained full of traffic, shops and restaurants continued to open, and staff kept returning to their places of employment. Touting, particularly amongst the transport operators, had intensified yet most seemed resigned to the fact that prospective clientele would eventually come to them if their goods/services were required. The continued ingenuity and resilient attitude of locals was evident in t-shirts for sale conveying messages such as “Osama Don’t Surf”, “F**K Terrorists” and “Bali Loves Peace”.

Early recovery responses require ingenuity and resilient attitudes of local people
While not prolific in number, foreign tourists were still evident at this time. Among the surfers, backpackers, budget travellers, Bali “faithful” and simply curious, were the many overseas business entrepreneurs seeking to benefit from a downturn in trade. Empty poolside bars, deserted restaurants and the early closing times of shops and entertainment venues however, clearly demonstrated how the nature of the Kuta had changed since October 12. There was a particularly noticeable absence of young Australians, rowdy party goers, and the “high spending” international package-deal travellers. More Indonesian tourists also visited the area, yet the activities and combined spending of all of these consumers were insufficient to make up the shortfall in prior income.

Beneath the warm smiles and willing conversations of the residents, a sadness and confusion seemed to prevail. Many had expressed difficulty in understanding foreign government advisories recommending people avoid their island, which had always been known for its ideology of peace and harmony. Approachable tourists were regularly asked to advise and assure everyone they met that Bali had once again become a safe place to visit. While trying to remain optimistic about the future, most locals were concerned with the daily realities of trying to find the money to feed families, send children to school, pay rent and simply cope.

Preliminary strategies—development and implementation

Official Indonesian government management strategies as reported by media during this period focused predominantly on improved national and regional security, the pursuit of justice and promotional campaigns (Kalla 2003, World Bank 2003). While the then proposed investment in local infrastructure projects such as water, drainage, sewage, and improved pavements would eventually prove beneficial to the residents of Kuta, such development plans were seen to do little to help alleviate the more immediate economic concerns. A series of social support programs addressing health, education and unemployment were also planned for the ‘vulnerable’ within the local community; however, few know if implementation ever followed.

Many of the initial recovery strategies were developed with the support and assistance of international governments and organisations such as the World Bank and USAid. While willing to co-ordinate with the Indonesian government, a large number of NGOs, volunteers, and donors chose to join the rapidly expanding Bali Recovery Group. The primary focus of this co-ordinating committee was to assist the effected Indonesians, including those economically impacted by loss of their livelihood (Bali Recovery Group 2004). Formally meeting on a monthly basis this group discussed new developments, relevant issues and summarised the progress of existing relief programs.

Despite the convictions and genuine intentions of the Bali Recovery Group, closer investigation reveals they were far from an integrated operational unit. Dominated by non-Indonesians with independent sources of sponsorship and funding, there appeared to be no uniform agenda for recovery—except to help. Many of the member organisations were also obliged to address the expectations of their donors as a priority. Initiated with minimal public consultation, projects often demonstrated limited consideration of existing issues of sustainable development, cross-cultural dynamics and understanding of the real needs and aspirations of the local community.

Lack of trust or familiarity, due to political, jurisdictional and/or personal disputes also resulted in suspicion.

Over the rubble of destroyed buildings on Legian Street many tourism businesses are rebuilt.
and poor communication among many participants. A seemingly valid proposal to establish a jointly funded co-ordination centre to operate as a centralised data collection and dissemination point was dismissed by the majority without further discussion or clarification. While unanimous decisions are rarely a political reality, the Bali Recovery Group seemed to lack the consensus for effective, efficient collaboration. In a country renowned for its corruption and misuse of public funds many organisations remained reluctant to offer full accountability and transparency (Karyadi 2003).

In spite of such shortcomings, the Bali Recovery Group still managed to play a vital role in the early disaster management process. In addition to providing a forum for dispersing information and raising awareness of certain issues, it also presented an opportunity to network with a diversity of people with a range of experience. Regular updates were provided by various subcommittees regarding the status of medical assistance, counselling, education, the environment and economic recovery. Many participant groups became actively and effectively involved in ensuring basic living standards were maintained and that unemployment and retraining concerns were appropriately addressed.

With typical human pride and resilience, most residents of Kuta and Bali preferred not to be seen as victims requiring and expecting aid. Many were oblivious to the money that was apparently raised on their behalf, or even where such funds may have been spent. Meaningful assistance at this grass roots community level would equate to the provision of economic and social security. Few of the reactive, short-term strategies implemented at this stage counted for significant medium and long-term effects, as the level of social vulnerability remained high.

Continued adversity and resilience

Over the passing days and months, media and public attention has been drawn to other issues in various parts of the world. Bali and its inhabitants have continued to readjust and generally persist with their daily lives. Recovery to pre-crisis conditions has remained elusive, as many of the initial measures used to manage have become less viable. Despite the obvious instability, tourism has remained at the core of the Balinese economy as the regional government, businesses and community members have each endeavoured to succeed within an increasingly competitive market—with varying results. As the extent of the crisis has become more apparent the priorities and issues for many stakeholders have also changed.

Tourism initiatives—recreating image

While the afflicted community and tourism industry of Bali have strived to move beyond the negative images and memories of the tragic Kuta bombings, hostilities in Iraq, the “global war against terrorism”, and concerns regarding contagion of Sudden Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and the Avian (Bird) Flu have affected travel demand world-wide. Risk, whether real or perceived, remains a strong determinant in the decision making process of the travelling public. To re-establish itself as a popular tourist destination Bali has needed to regain consumer confidence.

The Indonesian Government embarked on a number of active strategies to emphasise and assure safety and security including:

• identifying and prosecuting the Bali Bombing suspects;
• strengthening international intelligence sharing arrangements;
• introducing new anti-terrorism laws; and
• increasing the highly visible police and security presence across Bali, particularly at seaports and airports (CGI 2003).

As countries like Holland and Japan eventually chose to relax or revoke their travel warnings the terrorist bombing of the J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, August 2003 undermined much international confidence. The continued tolerance of radical Islamic militant groups, regional instability in provinces such as Aceh and Ambon and an historically unpredictable political environment has meant that many foreign advisories regarding Indonesia have remained (Bali Update 2004).

International marketing and public relations firms were also employed by various organisations to assist in the promotion and restoration of a positive destination image for the area. Campaigns and slogans like Bali for the World and Kuta Karnival of Life were introduced to emphasise the rich natural and cultural assets of the island rather than simply offering details of the numerous tourist facilities and services available. Large scale events, such as the one year anniversary memorial, have been staged to draw favourable media attention. Bali Discovery Tours (Bali Update 2004) reports that local industry representatives have redoubled efforts in tourism trade.
shows and exhibitions, as international journalists and travel agents have been invited to experience Bali first-hand (Bali Update 2004). Regardless of such promotions, the heavy concessions offered by airlines, hotels and tour operators appear to be the primary incentive in luring potential clientele back to Bali.

**The recovery status (18 months after the terrorist attacks)**

For the tourism industry, revitalisation and continuing growth in visitor numbers appears promising. Many airlines have rerouted or scheduled new flights to the island while hotels and businesses are experiencing renewed patronage. Direct foreign arrivals have reached unprecedented highs while occupancy rates are generally above 80% (BPS Statistics Indonesia 2004). Despite such recent instability, tourism for Bali has demonstrated a remarkable resilience. While such achievements are optimistic, closer investigation reveals that the social and economic crisis is not yet over for the community.

As Bali has become a more affordable destination, the type and quality of tourist has also changed. The traditional long-haul North American and European market segment has been well surpassed by domestic, Asian and budget Australian travellers with shorter visits and reduced daily expenditures (BPS Statistics Indonesia 2004, Bali Update 2004). Despite a revival in the number of revellers and young visitors, spending and behaviour patterns have yet to return to pre-crisis levels. Continued discounting and efforts to remain competitive have meant that many local businesses, families and individuals are still struggling financially.

Many of the social and victim support groups formed directly after the terrorist attacks in 2002 have now disbanded or moved on to sponsor other causes. The Bali Recovery Group has not formally met since August 2003, although various elements have continued to pursue issues of local health, education and the environment (Bali Recovery Group 2004, BaliSOS 2004). Without additional aid and government funding the majority of community co-ops are unable to provide further assistance. Employment remains limited and wages low. Families that haven’t met their financial obligations are now facing the possibility of losing ancestral land used as security on bank loans. Sexual exploitation of locals, particularly prostitution and paedophilia, is reportedly on the rise. Despite a strong familial and community support network, most hope and pray for the return of their social and economic independence.
While the community still experiences negative impacts subsequent to the tragedy, life does continue. In the absence of viable long-term alternatives most remain reliant on tourism revenues. Whether attracted by the cheap deals available, or conducting a pilgrimage to the memorial and “Ground Zero”, an obvious return in visitor numbers has helped reaffirm local commitment to the industry. An improvement in economic prospects for most has resulted in a comparable reduction in visible desperation. Predicted reprisals against Muslim residents did not eventuate as the level of social tension has drastically reduced. The incidence of public gambling has also decreased with more relaxed conversation and public commerce. Business still remains slow for many, particularly in the more remote tourist locations, yet they try to remain buoyant.

In such an atmosphere of optimistic uncertainty, tourism development continues almost unabated in Bali. Internet and telecommunication facilities catering predominantly to tourists are becoming more abundant. ATMs are prolific (secure cubicles are even air-conditioned), additional hotels and entertainment facilities have been created, and more travel/tour companies seem to be forming. Premises that have been vacated by lack of business or bankruptcy are soon re-occupied by other tenants. While local merchants and craft shops compete for profitable sales large multi-storey shopping centres have been erected to meet the tourist’s every souvenir demand in a convenient, controlled and comfortable environment. Ownership and investment in these developments is rarely local.

Employment prospects for residents seem to be marginally improved. Security measures enforced post-bombing requiring non-residents to apply and be sponsored for a work permit has reduced migration to the island, and the competition for limited jobs. Although wages have not increased substantially, demand for services is once again increasing. As many locals have resorted to sharing rented shop space and/or homes with family and friends to reduce costs, it is apparent that the shared adversity has drawn the community closer. Such fellowship, whether out of necessity or voluntary, has been credited with a growth in public concern regarding regional health, poverty, education and environmental issues.

Un fortunately the amount of financial assistance available for sustainable options remains limited. Despite the influx of international interest and funds following the terrorist attacks, little has been achieved in terms of long-term resources and a universally available social safety net. Most residents that benefited from improved tourism must now repay debts or re-invest money in family and/or business. The local government has remained limited in both political influence and finances. Even as the economic and social statistics begin to reveal the flow-on effects of this crisis, the community remains susceptible to other contingencies.

**Challenges and successes to integrated crisis management**

While initial strategies developed after the terrorist attacks demonstrated a high degree of public consensus, political, economic and even personal differences soon worked to undermine the establishment of an effective, united partnership of stakeholders as recommended in the relevant literature. Despite the shared objective of recovery and greater resilience, government, businesses, NGOs and local community in Bali each seemed to have different concerns. Resultant crisis management plans, strategies and associated promotional campaigns have been eclectic and far from holistic.

As a direct consequence of the tragedy and subsequent foreign assistance, emergency procedures, equipment, training and medical facilities for the island have improved substantially—yet access still remains beyond the means of most residents. Of the various NGOs and agencies that responded to the situation, a number continue to operate within Bali, however associated projects have remained only nominally co-ordinated. Successful activities such as provincial poverty alleviation, educational support and environmental pollution control, have been difficult to replicate on a large scale due to limited resources (Parum Samigita Forum 2004, BaliSOS 2004).
Promotional efforts, security improvements and heavy discounting have helped to attract tourism back to Bali yet such tactics have created their own social and economic issues. In an environment of increased security checks, police and military personnel, both tourist and residents still profess to nervousness regarding the possibility of further attacks. Irrespective of such concerns, a return in revenues has meant that most residents continue to pursue tourist dollars rather than alternative, more sustainable sources of income. Additional efforts required to retain employment or stay competitive have generally had detrimental effects for family, business and finances. Despite the increase in public awareness, community participation in the formal decision-making process of most development on the island still remains minimal.

Perhaps the greatest obstacle to achieving recovery and systematic co-operation in Bali has been the existing economic and socio-political structure (Asian Market Research 2002). Synonymous with most developing nations, Indonesia demonstrates a high level of social vulnerability with inadequate public infrastructure and a negligible social security network. Development policies, particularly in relation to the tourism industry, often focus on economic returns with limited local participation or consideration of associated social and environmental impacts. Financing for additional resources and facilities that would ultimately benefit a community's resilience and capacity to recover from a disaster has generally been considered a low priority.

As a Hindu island in a predominantly Islamic nation, Bali also represents a complex political, cultural and ideological situation (Bali Update 2004). While local government organisations exist within a national framework, traditional laws and social structure have retained a popular significance. Jurisdictional problems, allegations of corruption, suspicion and minimal public consultation are common. Recent decentralisation of Indonesian government departments and responsibilities has created additional confusion and conflict. The controversial Visa-on-Arrival fee for most foreign tourists, introduced in February 2004 (and subsequent dispersal of funds collected), is continued evidence of the disparity that exists between the priorities of the Balinese and central Indonesian Government. With the most immediate and apparent conditions overcome it has been difficult to establish a co-ordinated, sustainable commitment to long-term capacity building measures at any level of Bali's recovery process.

Future directions

While Bali has yet to develop an effective integrated crisis management plan it is in the relatively rare position of possessing heightened community awareness and recent experience in surviving a large-scale disaster. Security, medical and emergency response upgrades implemented since have improved future capabilities for the island. The major impediments to achieving greater socio-economic resilience continue to be resources (human, material and financial), and open collaboration. As returning tourism revenues generate a renewed source of income for most, the opportunity exists to invest in personal education, retraining and family/business savings. Through progressive dialogue and networking, relevant stakeholders may be able to overcome their prejudices and commit both time and money into working together to protect the unique attributes and character of Bali.

It is a sad reflection of today's world that the island of Bali can never truly recover its pre-crisis “innocence”, however in the aftermath of this tragedy lies the chance to realise a safer, more alert and more resilient community—the ultimate emergency management priority.

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Post-script

The observations made in this article were based on research (secondary data), personal communications and volunteer experience conducted primarily in Kuta, mid-January to mid-February 2003, and May 2004.

References


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